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On 12 June 2016, a lone gunman killed 49 people and 
wounded 58 others in an attack on a gay nightclub in 
Orlando, Florida. During the shooting, the gunman made a 
9-1-1 call pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). He reportedly fired 
over 110 rounds of ammunition using at least two semi-
automatic weapons. Officials characterized the shooting as 
an act of terrorism. The Orlando shooting was the deadliest 
modern US mass shooting until October 2017.
Though extraordinary, Orlando is sadly another tragedy in 
a seemingly endless string of mass shootings (Berkowitz et al., 
2018). Given the scale of death and heartbreak that mass 
shootings engender, it is remarkable that so little is known 
about the public’s reaction to them. The prevailing wisdom 
seems to be that such tragedies do not catalyze policy change 
(Azari, 2017). Rather, shocking episodes of extreme gun vio-
lence are met by an entrenched and polarized public that is 
unable to muster consistent demands for government action.
We demonstrate that mass shootings do in fact move the 
public, rousing widespread anxiety. Anxiety research sug-
gests mass shootings, much like other tragedies, should 
affect people in two identifiable ways. First, people made 
anxious by shootings will seek protection from the per-
ceived threats and unpredictability (Albertson and Gadarian 
2015). Anxious citizens support policies, leaders and insti-
tutions viewed as protective and intended to minimize 
future risks (Huddy et al., 2005).
Second, anxiety shifts citizens’ reliance on habitual 
information processing to open cognition that is responsive 
to the unexpected and threatening events (Huddy et al., 
2007; Marcus et al., 2000). To presume the public is not 
sensitive to shootings, or that ideological preferences 
become intensified thereafter (Jang, 2018), is to neglect the 
role of anxiety. Among those made anxious by Orlando, 
ideological thinking should decline considerably. We there-
fore expect a sharp reduction in differences between liberals 
and conservatives on essential beliefs and preferences asso-
ciated with mass shootings; notably attributions of blame 
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for the Orlando shootings, gun-law preferences, support for 
government and presidential approval.
However, the extant literature does not address a linger-
ing question. Does anxiety-induced shifts in beliefs and 
preferences away from habitual responses affect both liber-
als and conservatives? We hypothesize that abandonment 
of ideological thinking turns on the alignment of ideology 
and anxiety. For example, after tragedies like Orlando, ide-
ology and anxiety should be aligned for liberals—that is, 
both belief and emotion encourage greater restrictions on 
gun ownership and gun blame for violence. In other words, 
here, we expect liberals will not experience conflict: high 
anxiety about the Orlando shooting will reinforce liberals’ 
pre-existing preferences. However, among conservatives 
anxiety and ideology point in opposite directions. 
Conservatives will experience conflict between ideological 
preferences about guns and high anxiety induced by the 
shooting. Therefore, we expect anxiety to exhibit a power-
ful effect among conservatives, with anxiety loosening the 
grip of ideology on relevant attitudes.
In summary, shocking violence leads anxious people to 
adapt situation-specific beliefs and preferences consistent 
with threatening events (Atkeson and Maestas, 2012). 
Anxiety leads liberals to stay the course on gun control and 
blaming guns while anxious conservatives temper their 
ideological positions on guns. In general, when ideology 
and anxiety are orthogonal – as is the case for conservatives 
in the aforementioned example – we anticipate a decline in 
ideological thinking. When ideology and anxiety are 
aligned, the effect of ideology on preferences remains the 
same. Consequently, anxiety after a mass shooting can cre-
ate conditions where people with different ideological pre-
dispositions move much closer together in their policy 
preferences and blame attributions, and thereby create an 
opportunity for policy change.
Theoretical development
The targets of mass shootings are extraordinarily diverse: 
the lives of young children, high school and college stu-
dents, employees, church parishioners and concert enthusi-
asts’ end without warning. Yet, to our knowledge, no 
research examines public emotions after mass shootings. 
Nor does it appear that much research directly tests whether 
mass shootings influence support for gun regulation. There 
is significant polling data that links support for gun control 
and mass shootings, but the analyses are descriptive and 
aggregate in nature (Parker et al., 2017). A notable excep-
tion is Newman and Hartman’s (2017) recent study. They 
show that proximity to a mass shooting makes the threat of 
gun violence more salient, which in turn boosts public sup-
port for gun control.
Yet extensive media attention to extraordinary tragedies 
can powerfully connect people to events, overcoming the 
obstacle of geographical distance and bringing about 
broadly-felt emotions. For example, Huddy et al. (2005) 
reported widespread anxiety after 9/11. Almost half of the 
sample felt anxious, or worried at least sometimes, approxi-
mately one-third felt scared or frightened sometimes or 
very often, and a majority were concerned about another 
attack.
Concerns about how distant events might indirectly 
influence the public can also produce widespread anxiety. 
Atkeson and Maestas’s (2012) analyses of Katrina showed 
a large portion of the public were concerned that hurricanes 
would negatively impact the nation’s economy. Nearly 
75% were somewhat or very concerned about that possibil-
ity. Finally in Anxious Politics, Albertson and Gadarian 
(2015) demonstrated significant anxieties arising in the 
context of dramatic events and related exposure. However, 
we find little comparable scholarly attention to emotions 
after mass shootings.1
Anxiety
Marcus et al.’s (2000) theory of Affective Intelligence 
offers a valuable framework to consider the role of emo-
tions after mass shootings. The theory posits two affective 
subsystems of the brain that have important and discrete 
ties to an impressive variety of attitudes and behaviors. 
Here we focus on the surveillance system, which is primar-
ily responsible for identifying threatening situations that 
produce anxiety.
Anxiety develops as people confront an unusual or novel 
threat. Once the surveillance system detects unexpected or 
threatening stimuli, it evokes anxiety, interrupting on-going 
information processing and shifting attention toward the 
threat. The shift encourages attention and learning, moti-
vating people to seek additional information.
Tragedies prompt the surveillance system. For example, 
those anxious after the 9/11 attacks watched more televi-
sion than the less anxious (Huddy et al., 2005). In addition, 
anxiety about the Iraq War increased the number of self-
reported thoughts about the war and the likelihood of con-
versing with others about it (Huddy et al., 2007). Valentino 
et al. (2008) experimentally induced anxiety and showed 
that it produced greater interest in and attention to presiden-
tial campaigns. Further Gadarian and Albertson (2014) 
reported that anxiety about immigration increased informa-
tion searches, improved recall of information and the anx-
ious were also attracted to threatening information.
The motive to search and learn arises as anxiety inhibits 
people’s reliance on habitual information processing. Prior 
habits are abandoned for “reasoned and informed consid-
eration of the alternatives” (Marcus et al., 2000: 62). 
Unanticipated, abrupt and traumatizing events thus disturb 
habitual cognitive patterns, inducing anxiety and causing 
people to reconsider standard ways of thinking, increasing 
attention to their environments and engaging in learning 
processes. People relatively undisturbed by tragedy should 
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therefore exhibit the usual directional processing, where 
common ideological differences characterize beliefs and 
preferences. Among the anxious, a marked deterioration of 
ideological thinking is expected.
In addition, we argue that such deterioration will not be 
uniform across ideological categories. For example, evi-
dence suggests anxiety does not always lead to more rea-
soned and informed judgments but to overestimation of risk 
and risk-avoidant beliefs and behaviors (Huddy et al., 
2007). This indicates habitual processing may persist after 
anxiety takes hold. Similarly, Atkeson and Maestas (2012) 
argued that anxiety does not simply trigger a switch from 
habitual- to accuracy-based reasoning. Rather, shocking 
events direct attention to media and learning about threat-
ening situations. The associated anxiety makes people more 
receptive to the information they seek. Such information 
could fit well with existing ideological preferences. Thus 
while anxiety produced an information search, it could 
result in the strengthening of ideological thinking.
It is therefore plausible that in some instances anxiety 
reinforces ideological preferences and in others anxiety 
produces ideological moderation. The key is to identify the 
effects of anxiety and determine whether those are consist-
ent with those produced by ideology. The literature sug-
gests anxiety increases support for policies and institutions 
perceived as protective and capable of minimizing future 
risks (Huddy et al., 2005). Support for government and 
gun-control policies are typically considered protective and 
a liberal position. The effects of liberals’ anxiety and ideol-
ogy in this example are therefore aligned. For conserva-
tives, however, anxiety encourages support for institutions 
and policies that are generally opposed to their ideological 
beliefs. Since conservatives’ anxiety and ideology are in 
conflict, high anxiety should then loosen the grip of ideol-
ogy on conservatives’ essential beliefs and preferences 
associated with mass shootings.
Hypothesis
When prominent mass shootings happen, some people 
develop anxiety about the senseless violence, the victims 
and what the violence may mean for their own lives. They 
are vigilant and begin to search for answers. Among the 
anxious, the effort to reduce further risks is expected to pro-
duce support for relevant causes, policies, leaders, and 
institutions.
H1: Relative to less anxiety, those experiencing high 
anxiety about mass shootings will be more likely to 
blame relevant causes, support gun regulation, govern-
ment and the President.
In addition, anxiety about mass shootings should modulate 
the effects of ideology.
H2: High anxiety about mass shootings should reduce 
the effects of ideology on blame attributions for the 
shootings, on support for gun regulation and on govern-
ment support and approval of the President.
Finally, when an ideological group supports a policy prefer-
ence or causal belief, and anxiety also portends support, we 
anticipate modest, if any, effect of emotion (ideological 
thinking remains). However, if an ideological group sup-
ports a policy or attribution, yet anxiety signifies opposi-
tion, the effects of anxiety should be extensive (ideology 
thinking modulates).
H3: When the anxiety motive is aligned with ideological 
preference, the effect of anxiety will be limited. When 
anxiety motive is in conflict with ideological inclina-
tion, its effect will be strong.
Data and method
We employed Clear Voice Research (CVR) to conduct a 
national survey of US adults, starting just 6 days after the 
Orlando tragedy – 18 June 2016. We fielded the survey 
promptly after the shooting to capitalize on the anticipated 
emotional responses (see Supplemental Appendix for sur-
vey details).
We presented respondents with three questions 
designed to measure anxiety about the Orlando shootings. 
Anxiety is typically measured by self-reported feelings 
(Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Atkeson and Maestas, 
2012; Huddy and Feldman, 2011; Huddy et al., 2007; 
Mackuen et al., 2007; Erisen, 2018). Respondents were 
asked: “Thinking about the mass shooting in Orlando, 
Florida how does this shooting make you feel on a scale 
from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating not at all (anxious, fright-
ened, worried) and 5 indicating the highest level of 
(anxious, frightened, worried)”. About 25% reported a 
significant level of anxiousness, a similar percentage were 
frightened by events and nearly 40% reported being very 
worried. The three items share substantial covariance. The 
Cronbach’s alpha was α = 0.89. We combined the three 
items into an additive index of anxiety.2
Blame attributions
We assessed the degree of blame respondents’ attributed to 
three causes widely reported after Orlando: gun availabil-
ity, terrorism and mental illness. We asked: “On a scale 
from 1 to 10 with 1 being none at all and 10 being a lot of 
blame, how much blame for this shooting would you place 
on gun availability?; on terrorism?; on mental illness?” 
Terrorism generated a mean blame score of 6.74, mental 
illness 7.14 and gun availability 6.11. Conservatives 
reported the highest average level of blame for terrorism 
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(8.1), nearly 2.5 points greater than liberals’ assessment 
(5.8). Liberals strongly blamed guns (8.2) while conserva-
tives scarcely did (3.9). Both groups blamed mental illness 
(liberals 7.5, conservatives 6.5).
Independent variables. For ideology we employed the con-
ventional seven-point scale.3 As noted, anxiety is an index 
of three related measures coded low to high. We also 
included several exogenous influences likely to affect 
blame attributions and anxiety. Based on previous research, 
women in response to terror attacks reported greater anxi-
ety than men (Huddy et al., 2002; Huddy et al., 2005). 
Blacks reported higher levels of perceived threat (Huddy 
et al., 2005) and anxiety after 9/11 (Huddy et al., 2002). 
More education reduced anxiety about terrorism, as did 
higher income (Huddy et al., 2005; Skitka et al., 2004). 
Additionally, after the 9/11 attacks, younger people felt 
more anxious and threatened than older people (Huddy 
et al., 2005).
Another necessary control is gun ownership. Gun own-
ers are substantially less likely to attribute mass shootings 
to gun availability (Joslyn and Haider-Markel, 2017). We 
also know that those closely following the news of an event 
are more likely to be exposed to the predominant frames 
about the causes and consequences of the event (Atkeson 
and Maestas, 2012: 41). As such, we included a measure of 
a respondent’s reported attention to news about the Orlando 
shootings.
Results
Table 1 provides OLS main effects model estimates and 
then includes an interaction term. For the interaction mod-
els, we followed Marcus et al. (2000) and MacKuen et al. 
(2014) and divided the sample by those reporting very little 
anxiety (one standard deviation below the mean) and those 
highly anxious (one deviation above the mean). This parti-
tion aptly captures respondents’ experiencing either low or 
high anxiety and thus corresponds well with theoretical 
constructs.4 Also, independent variables were recoded to a 
0 to 1 range for comparability.
Notice first the consistent effect of ideology across the 
three main effects models. Comparing estimates across and 
within models, no other variable equals ideology’s power 
Table 1. The impact of ideology and anxiety on blame attributions about the Orlando shooting.
Independent variables Guns Terror Mental illness
Main effects Interaction Main effects Interaction Main effects Interaction






























































































































R-square 0.396 0.46 0.200 0.22 0.08 0.10
n 1051 551 1051 551 1051 551
OLS estimates: variables are rescaled from 0–1 for comparison. Standard errors in parenthesis.
ap<0.01;
bp<0.05.
Degree of blame attribution questions: “On a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 being none at all and 10 being a lot of blame, how much blame for this 
shooting would you place on …?” The decrease in n from main effects to interaction model is due to division of the anxiety index into high and 
low categories, deleting middle responses. Ideology ^ con indicates ideology with higher scores being more conservative. IdeoXAnxiety indicates an 
interaction term for Ideology multiplied by Anxiety 
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to predict blame levels. It is robust for guns and terrorism 
yet comparatively modest for mental illness. Second, across 
the blame categories, anxiety is a reliable determinant. The 
effect is strong, positive and highlights the direct emotional 
influence of Orlando. Third, the interaction term is signifi-
cant for blaming guns and terrorism, the two most ideologi-
cally driven blame categories.
Figure 1 depicts the interaction terms for the blame gun 
and terrorism models. The vertical axis shows degree of 
blame attributed to guns and terrorism and the horizontal 
axis represents respondents’ ideology from very liberal to 
very conservative. Observe the estimated slopes for anx-
ious respondents are relatively flat and modest compared to 
the less anxious. Anxiety clearly decreases differences 
between liberals and conservatives. Consider the “blame 
guns” graph. Anxious liberals assigned blame to guns a 
mere 1.8 points greater than anxious conservatives (liberals 
8.3 to conservatives 6.5). The same gap between less anx-
ious liberals and conservatives is nearly twice that size at 
3.4 points. In blaming terrorism, the divide between anx-
ious liberals and conservatives shrinks still further. Anxious 
conservatives were less than a point higher in blaming ter-
rorism than anxious liberals (conservative 7.6 to liberals 
6.9). The divide is nearly 3.0 points among the less anxious. 
This is strong evidence to support hypotheses 2.
Figure 1 also shows that anxiety split conservatives on 
guns and separated liberals on terrorism. In fact, the blame 
guns chart demonstrates that anxious conservatives were 
more similar to liberals than to less anxious conservatives. 
Likewise, the terrorism chart indicates anxious liberals 
were nearly the same as conservatives in blaming terror-
ism, and distinctly different from non-anxious liberals.
Last, Figure 1 supports hypothesis 3. The influence of anxi-
ety among liberals’ blaming guns is muted; that is liberals 
blame guns for the shooting, and high anxiety merely supports 
that belief. The ideological tendency among conservatives is 
to not blame guns. Anxiety works against that tendency, mov-
ing conservatives to consider causes typically ignored. Greater 
gun blame among anxious conservatives is the result. Just the 
opposite pattern is evident among anxious liberals in the ter-
rorism chart. Regardless of ideological category, when anxiety 
encourages support for blame attributions that are inconsistent 
with habitual ideological attributions, the grip of ideology on 
attributions weakens.
Gun laws and beliefs about government
We also asked respondents their preferences on access to gun 
ownership: “How strongly would you favor or oppose new 
laws that would restrict access to gun ownership?” Fifty-six 
percent favored or strongly favored new laws to restrict gun 
ownership. Respondents were queried about government and 
the efficacy of government action in preventing mass shoot-
ings. “Which of the following statements comes closer to 
your overall view: ‘Government and society can take action 
that will be effective in preventing shootings like Orlando’ 
[45%] or ‘shootings like the one in Orlando will happen again 
regardless of what action is taken by government [55%]’.”
Table 2 presents logistic regression models. As expected, 
conservatives did not support gun regulations and were sig-
nificantly less likely than liberals to believe government 
action would prevent mass shootings. In addition, anxiety 
increased the probability of favoring new laws to restrict gun 
ownership and enhanced the likelihood of believing in gov-
ernment action. The main effects of anxiety are impressive, 
raising the likelihood of favoring restrictive gun laws from 
0.40 among the least anxious to nearly 0.70 among the most 
anxious respondents.
Anxiety also moderated the effect of ideology. Both inter-
action terms are significant and substantively important. 
Figure 1. The effects of ideology and anxiety on blaming guns and terrorism for the Orlando shooting.
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Figure 2 shows that less anxious respondents travelled the 
well-worn ideological path on guns and beliefs about gov-
ernment. The chances of less anxious liberals favoring gun 
restrictions is very high (0.87) and predictably very low for 
less anxious conservatives (0.08). Among anxious respond-
ents, ideology did not affect beliefs about government. The 
proximate horizontal line across the ideological scale denotes 
very little to no division between anxious liberals and con-
servatives on beliefs about government effectiveness in pre-
venting mass shootings. In addition, anxious conservatives 
appear remarkably open to new gun laws. The likelihood that 
anxious conservatives favored such laws increased to nearly 
0.50. This change is noteworthy and brings liberals and con-
servatives much closer together on their gun-law prefer-
ences. A similar pattern emerged for beliefs about government 
capacity to prevent mass shootings. Anxious conservatives 
were approximately 0.20 more likely to believe government 
can prevent mass shootings than less anxious conservatives.
Confidence in government and Presidential 
approval
Following the questions on the Orlando shootings, respond-
ents were asked to consider their confidence in govern-
ment: “How much confidence do you have in the federal 
government? None at all, not very much, a fair amount, a 
great deal.” We combined responses into two categories, 1 
- great deal and fair amount (35%); 0 - none and not very 
much. Respondents also reported Presidential approval. 
Predictably, both measures produced sharp ideological 
division (see Table 3). However, greater anxiety triggered 
support for government and approval of the perceived 




Interaction Government action 
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Interaction
Main effects Main effects




















































































Chi-square 372.21 225.68 92.98 67.60
n 1051 551 1051 551
Logistic regression estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis.
ap<.01;
bp<.10.
Question wording: “How strongly would you favor or oppose new laws that would restrict access to gun ownership? 1=strongly favor, favor; 0 = 
oppose, strongly oppose.”
“Government and society can take action that will be effective in preventing shootings like Orlando or shootings like Orlando will happen again 
regardless of what action is taken by government?”
The decrease in n from main effects to interaction model is due to division of the anxiety index into high and low categories, deleting middle re-
sponses. IdeoXAnxiety indicates an interaction term for Ideology multiplied by Anxiety.
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Figure 2. The effects of ideology and anxiety on support for restrictive gun laws and beliefs government can prevent shootings.
Table 3. The impact of ideology and anxiety on confidence in government and approval of the President.
Independent variables Confidence in 
government
Interaction Approval of the
President
Interaction
Main effects Main effects




















































































Chi-square 150.49 95.35 504.99 260.78
n 1051 551 1051 551
Logistic regression estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis.
ap<.01;
bp<.10.
Question wording: “How much confidence do you have in the federal government? None at all, not very much (0), a fair amount, a great deal (1).”
“Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barak Obama is handling his job as President?”
The decrease in n from main effects to interaction model is due to division of the anxiety index into high and low categories, deleting middle re-
sponses. IdeoXAnxiety indicates an interaction term for Ideology multiplied by Anxiety.
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leader of government. In addition, anxiety–ideology inter-
actions are significant and Figure 3 confirms the expected 
patterns.
The powerful effects of ideology are in fact tempered by 
anxiety. This is especially evident for confidence in govern-
ment. Across the ideological spectrum, differences in 
respondents’ confidence in government vanished among 
those anxious about Orlando. This result parallels previous 
findings and perhaps best illustrates the strength of the emo-
tional-based mechanism triggered after Orlando. Anxiety 
effectively cancelled long-standing ideological divisions 
about government (H2). And anxiety did so primarily by 
inducing conservatives to reconsider government (H3). The 
probability that less anxious conservatives expressed confi-
dence in government was typically slight (0.10). That same 
probability among anxious conservatives increased nearly 
fourfold (0.38), roughly equivalent to liberals.
Conclusion
A primary result of higher individual anxiety about Orlando 
was a marked decline in ideological division on the per-
ceived causes of shootings, support for new restrictive gun 
laws, increased confidence in government and higher presi-
dential approval. Our analyses show that a mass shooting 
produced an emotionally-based mechanism that created 
less division in the public about the sources of violence and 
potential solutions.
The findings point to two conclusions. First, with respect 
to empirical inquiry, mass shootings merit greater scholarly 
attention. Shootings draw widespread media coverage, 
involve virtually all socio-political groups, occur without 
warning and are geographically dispersed. The public 
reacts predictably, with a significant portion feeling anx-
ious about them. Across seven attitudinal contexts, a sig-
nificant and strong main effect of anxiety appeared. Anxiety 
intensified blame on guns, terrorism and mental illness, 
boosted support for restrictive laws on gun ownership, 
enhanced beliefs that government could prevent shootings, 
increased confidence in government and raised Presidential 
approval. These results are consistent with the notion that 
anxiety increases support for government institutions as 
well as polices that might mitigate potential risk.
Future work should consider perceptions of threat 
(Huddy et al., 2005), the distinct effects of other emotions 
(Huddy, Feldman and Cassese, 2007), and possible connec-
tions to gun policy, institutional support, and approval of 
political leaders. Although mass shootings are now fairly 
common, variation in the number of people involved, the 
types of victims, and the settings likely arouse different 
emotions and evoke distinct blame attributions.
Second, we showed anxiety consistently inhibited peo-
ple’s dependence on ideological thinking. An anxious public 
weighs information it may have otherwise ignored. Strong 
ideological differences receded and in some instances nearly 
disappeared. Consider that on issues such as gun regulation, 
government effectiveness and perceived causes of mass 
shootings, anxiety substantially moderated entrenched ideo-
logical divisions. The effects were reliable, robust and con-
sistent with the emotion and politics literature.
Finally, when the effects of anxiety and ideology were at 
odds, each inspiring different policy preferences and blame 
Figure 3. The effects of ideology and anxiety on confidence in government and the job approval of President Obama.
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attributions, the grip of ideology diminished. Notable 
departures from habitual beliefs and attitudes resulted. Yet 
when anxiety and ideology encouraged the same attitudes 
and attributions, routine ideological thinking continued. 
Anxiety and ideology can thus reinforce one another or 
work against the other. It is in those latter instances, where 
ideology and anxiety clash, ideological thinking modulates 
and the opportunity for policy change may grow.
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1. There are a few studies that examine causal attributions 
for shootings (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Joslyn and 
Haider-Markel 2013; 2017).
2. The index mean = 8.1 and standard deviation = 3.5.
3. We used ideology in this analysis (see Mackuen et al. 2007 
for a discussion of ideology and emotion). However, because 
ideology and party identification are strongly linked in our 
data (r = .70) the results are very similar if party identifica-
tion is substituted for ideology.
4. Classifying high and low anxiety as a simple mean split does 
produce similar results; see Supplemental Appendix, Table 
A2, for relevant estimated coefficients.
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